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INTRODUCTION
Rule 23(b)(3) has always had a bit of a self-confidence problem, at least
when it comes to mass torts. Although it offers what its drafters called an
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“adventuresome” opportunity to unite and bind a class whose members’
claims share common questions of fact or law,1 it has always contained hedges
that cabin its applicability. These hedges include the requirements of
predominance and superiority and the unlimited right of a class member to opt
out.2 Ultimately, Rule 23(b)(3) creates the possibility of a binding judgment on
all members of a mass tort class, but the limitations embedded in the rule make
such a judgment—and its potential benefits—difficult to realize.
Meanwhile, the MDL statute,3 which does not by its terms seek to
produce binding judgments on behalf of a representative class but only
transfers cases to a single court for “pretrial proceedings,” has flourished in
mass tort cases—often achieving the kind of mass settlements that one could
have imagined might be obtainable under Rule 23(b)(3).4 Though MDL has
detractors, in an era defined by large caseloads and vanishing trials, it is the
poster child for successful aggregate litigation.
In this contribution to this Symposium marking fifty years since the 1966
Amendments to Rule 23 were adopted, I examine closely the roots of some of
the structural reasons why MDL has succeeded as a mass tort aggregator. In
short, MDL works in large measure because of its split personality. An MDL
functions simultaneously as a tight consolidation of cases into a unitary package
before a single judge and a temporary coordination of individual cases destined
for remand to the districts in which they were filed. MDL’s ability to oscillate
between these two personalities facilitates the strong aggregation of cases
without formally violating traditional norms of litigant autonomy. Because
MDL neither formally changes the character of any individual case within it nor
produces a judgment that binds an absent party, it does not require the due
process–based limitations of the class action rule. An MDL is easily formed and
impossible to exit, but the availability of an eventual trial for each individual
case ensures that the purportedly temporary coordination for pretrial

1 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969)
(referring to (b)(3) as “the most adventuresome of the new types” of class action). Charles Alan
Wright characterized it as “the most doubtful part of the new rule.” Proposed Changes in Federal Civil,
Criminal, and Appellate Procedure, 31 TENN. L. REV. 417, 436 (1964).
2 Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic Imperative,
64 EMORY L.J. 293, 295 (2014) (describing how “the Committee hedged the new provision in with
procedural safeguards to protect absentees—giving class members notice and opt-out rights—and
limited its availability by requiring common questions to predominate and insisting the class form be
superior to other methods of adjudication”); see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL
LITIGATION 61 (2015) (describing the limitations included in 23(b)(3) as “restrictive”).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
4 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 265, 270 (2011) (explaining how MDL “creates the perfect conditions for an aggregate settlement”).
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proceedings does not produce the same sort of alarm that the class action does—
an irony in light of the centralization of power that MDL achieves.5
As I have detailed in another article in this law review, this mainspring of
MDL’s success has been part of the statute from the beginning and was a
product of a political compromise by the statute’s drafters in order to secure
support for its enactment.6 The small group of federal judges, and one
academic, Dean Phil C. Neal of the University of Chicago, who conceived of
and shepherded the MDL statute to passage some fifty years ago did so
because they believed that—in the words of MDL’s primary judicial
proponent, District Judge William Becker of Kansas City—a “litigation
explosion” was coming to the federal courts and permanent reform to federal
procedure was necessary to handle it.7 In particular, they believed that there
needed to be a provision that would centralize litigation of national scope
before a single federal judge—and that the judges hearing these cases should
be ones committed to the then somewhat novel principles of active case
management. The drafters, who understood that pretrial proceedings were
increasingly becoming the main event in large-scale litigation, believed that
“limited transfer for pretrial” would achieve their aims.8
Here, drawing on the records of the committees and drafters who created
the amended Rule 23 and the MDL statute, I focus on two episodes in the
MDL creation story.
First, I detail the MDL statute’s drafters’ collaboration with the Reporters
of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in 1963, in which the drafters of the
MDL statute made clear their intention that MDL would be the primary
aggregation device for mass torts, and one which invested plenary power in the
hands of the district judges to whom MDLs were assigned. The creators of the
MDL statute expressed to the Advisory Committee’s Reporters their strong
opposition to any opportunity to opt out of a consolidated mass tort proceeding,
because such a right could threaten the efficiencies of aggregate treatment.9
Second, I detail the MDL judges’ opposition to efforts by two firms,
Cravath, Swaine & Moore and Dechert, Price & Rhoades, to amend the
5
6

See infra Part I (noting the limitations placed on class actions but not on MDL).
Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 831 (2017).
7 Judicial Administration: Hearings on H.R. 3991, H.R. 6703, H.R. 8276, and H.R. 16575 Before
Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 26 (1966) [hereinafter Judicial
Administration Hearings] (statement of Hon. William H. Becker, Chief Judge, Western District of
Missouri) (“We feel that there is a litigation explosion occurring in the Federal courts along with
the population explosion and the technological revolution; that even with the addition of many new
judges, the caseload, the backlog of cases pending, is growing; and that some new tools are needed
by the judges in order to process the litigation . . . .”).
8 See Bradt, supra note 6, at 839.
9 See Infra Part II.
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proposed MDL statute to require predominance of common questions of law
or fact, modeled on Rule 23’s predominance requirement.10 Judge Becker, who
spearheaded the effort to pass the MDL statute, vociferously opposed the
amendment because he believed that inserting such a requirement would
cripple the statute’s ability to respond to the predicted “litigation explosion.”11
Becker understood that a predominance requirement would severely limit the
availability of MDL, particularly in tort cases involving the application of
multiple states’ laws. With the benefit of fifty years’ worth of hindsight, we
can see that Judge Becker’s prediction was on the nose.
Both of these episodes highlight the single-mindedness of the small group
that drafted the MDL statute: They believed a strong aggregation device was
necessary to protect the federal courts as an institution, and their thinking was
dominated by fulfilling that need, rather than by a motivation to create a device
that was in any real sense more protective of individual litigants’ interests.
In Part I of this Article, I will briefly outline the structural differences
between MDL and class actions, as well as how those differences create
advantages for MDL in aggregating mass tort cases. In Parts II and III, I will
tell the stories I described above. Placing the development of MDL against
the backdrop of the development of the class action reveals how the seeds of
MDL’s current dominance were planted long ago. Finally, in Part IV, I turn
briefly to the present. In a litigation landscape in which MDL is the dominant
mechanism for aggregation, it is necessary to turn a critical eye toward what
its creators wrought fifty years ago. Although judges and lawyers on both
sides of litigation have accustomed themselves to the benefits of the MDL
process, the notion that the cases do not lose their individual character by
being transferred into the collective, and therefore the protections of the class
action are inapposite, demands reconsideration. The central question going
forward in the era of MDL ascendancy will be how to tailor protection for
individual litigants within the MDL consolidation.
I. CLASS ACTIONS AND MDLS IN MASS TORTS
Although one could envision the class action as the essential procedural
device for resolving massive litigation, readers of this Symposium need no
extensive review of how the various limitations on Rule 23(b)(3) have
handicapped the availability of the mass tort class action, even for
settlement.12 After a brief heyday in the federal and state courts in the 1990s,
10
11
12

Infra Part III.
See Judicial Administration Hearings, supra note 7.
See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731 (2013)
(discussing how the class action device “has fallen into disfavor”); see also Miller, supra note 2, at
296-97 (“[T]he Supreme Court and several courts of appeals have rendered decisions that oblige
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decisions by lower federal courts and the Supreme Court diminished the
prospects for class certification, including for settlement-only classes, and
Congress threw cold water on state courts’ attempts to certify nationwide
classes by expanding federal jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness
Act.13 Courts have applied Rule 23’s restrictions, particularly the
predominance requirement, in myriad ways to prevent class certification.
Examples include additional factual gatekeeping at the class-certification
stage, scrutiny of whether the representative can adequately represent the
class (including those who may have “future claims” who are not yet members
of the class), and assessment of whether efficiency is reduced because the
individual factual or legal questions of the claimants overwhelm the common
questions.14 With respect to this last issue, it has proven to be a particularly
daunting obstacle for certification of the class when the class members’ claims
arise under multiple states’ laws.15
The Multidistrict Litigation Act aims somewhat lower than the class
action, but it does not burden itself with such limitations. On the surface, the
statute is comparatively bloodless: it provides only for limited transfer of
cases to “any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings,”
after which each case “shall be remanded by the panel . . . to the district from
which it was transferred . . . .”16 MDL, in that sense, is more modest than
Rule 23(b)(3). It does not create litigation that would otherwise not exist, for
instance by aggregating negative-value claims. Nor does it require any
reconceptualization of rights as belonging to groups instead of individuals.17
Instead, it consolidates only already-filed cases (and to-be-filed tagalong
district courts to require ‘rigorous’ adherence to each of the Rule 23 prerequisites . . . [so] the
availability of the class action has been constrained dramatically, thereby reducing its effectiveness
as a means of private enforcement.”).
13 See Richard Marcus, Bending in the Breeze: American Class Actions in the Twenty-First Century,
65 DEPAUL L. REV. 497, 504 (2016) (describing the brief “golden age” of the mass tort class action);
Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1507 (2008) (describing how the “federal appellate courts pretty quickly put
an end” to mass tort class actions and how “the Supreme Court made it very difficult for the lower
federal courts to certify” settlement classes).
14 Klonoff, supra note 12, at 734. While rumors of the mass tort class action’s ultimate demise
may be exaggerated, it has been well documented that it continues to face what Richard Marcus has
aptly called “headwinds.” Marcus, supra note 13, at 504.
15 See Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
2001, 2008 (2008) (discussing how in one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit “held that the burden was on the class action plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
state law variances did ‘not present insuperable obstacles’ to class certification.”).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523
U.S. 26, 39 (1998) (holding that the “straightforward language” of the statute requires remand unless
the parties waive their right to it).
17 Cf. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 19531980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 591 (2013) (comparing competing philosophies of class actions).
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cases), and, unless a class is certified, judgments made by the MDL court do
not formally bind any absentees, because presumably there are none. Indeed,
because there are no absentees in an MDL, no provision is made for adequate
representation.18 And, of course, the MDL statute does not contain the
predominance and superiority requirements, or any opportunity for litigants
to opt out.19 Because no absentees are bound and those who have filed cases
are entitled to a trial in the districts they initially chose, MDL appears to be
a rather modest procedural mechanism.
But make no mistake: the aims of the small group of men who drafted the
statute—the “Coordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation,” or “CCML”—
were not modest. The CCML, led by Dean Phil C. Neal of the University of
Chicago Law School, Judge Alfred P. Murrah of the Tenth Circuit, and Judge
William H. Becker of the Western District of Missouri, believed both that a
“litigation explosion” was coming to the federal courts due to increasing numbers
of mass torts and federal causes of action, and that such litigation must be
centralized and controlled by judges committed to the developing principles of
active pretrial case management.20 And they did not believe that the class action
device was up to the task.21 As a result, although on the surface MDL is a less
adventurous procedural innovation than the (b)(3) class action, its original drafters
thought it a “radical” addition to the federal procedural toolbox.22
Indeed, once one looks closely at how MDL works, one recognizes that
the statute is hardly modest in practice. All that is required to create an MDL
is “one or more common questions of fact” and the conclusion by the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) that transfer “will be for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient

18 Of course, there may be class actions within MDL cases that serve to bind absentees, but
this was not on the minds of the drafters. See infra Part II.
19 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1294 (2012) (noting the relative lack of “safeguards” in non-class aggregation). The MDL
statute does require notice to litigants that their cases have been transferred. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c).
But the problem of binding absentees without notice that bedevils Rule 23 does not exist because
there are no absentees in an MDL—every litigant has filed a case. The question of whether the
litigants who get swept into an MDL are functionally “absent,” however, is a separate question. See
Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for Aggregate Litigation and
Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 617 (2011) (noting that “there is no sharp distinction
between being a party with little actual control and being an absentee with none”).
20 See generally Bradt, supra note 6.
21 Infra Part II.C.
22 Phil C. Neal, Address at the Annual Conference of the Seventh Federal Circuit 18 (May 14,
1963) (transcript available in Papers of Judge William H. Becker, Records of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, Record Group 116, Coordinating Committee on Multiple Litigation, 19621968, National Archives, Kansas City, MO [hereinafter Becker Papers], Box 17, Folder 39) (“This is
perhaps a radical proposal, and I am unable to suggest any close analogy for such a power.”).
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conduct of such actions.”23 Once an MDL is established, all tagalong cases
filed thereafter rather seamlessly move to the MDL, and there is no
opportunity to exit until pretrial proceedings have concluded and cases are
remanded to the districts in which they were filed.24 During pretrial
proceedings, the MDL judge possesses all of the powers that the transferor
judge would have had, including the power to grant dispositive motions.25
MDL judges appoint steering committees of lawyers to prosecute the
litigation, may hold bellwether trials to generate information about the
relative strength of the claims, and steer the parties toward global resolution
of claims.26 Some judges even review those settlements and associated
attorneys’ fee provisions under the banner of the “quasi-class action.”27 As a
result, MDLs typically lead to mass settlements, and it has always been rare
that cases return home for trial.28 As trials become less likely overall, pretrial
proceedings have become the main event. Nowhere is this more true than in
MDL, where this pattern has become extraordinarily prominent.
Indeed, as the class action has receded, MDL has filled the void, especially
in cases involving state-law tort claims involving product liability or personal

23 28 U.S.C § 1407(a). Unlike the general transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), those factors are
not assessed case by case, party by party. As Edward Purcell has observed, “the provision was intended
to serve the goal of judicial economy and administrative convenience. The interests of the parties,
while relevant, are distinctly secondary.” Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon:
Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 482 n.234 (1992).
24 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due
Process, and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 111 (2015) (noting that the “plaintiff
whose claim is grouped together with countless others is given no choice in the matter”); Troy A.
McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 994 (2012)
(“[A] plaintiff drawn into MDL proceedings has little power to opt out in any meaningful sense.”).
25 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3866 (3d
ed. 2007) (“[T]he transferee judge inherits the entire pretrial jurisdiction that the transferor district
judge would have exercised . . . .”).
26 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 73 (2015)
(explaining that judges appoint steering committees in order to “streamline cases and avoid having
to communicate with hundreds of attorneys”); Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer
Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 541
(2003) (finding that MDL committees “dominate the conduct of pretrial litigation”).
27 Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing MultiDistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 111 (2010); Samuel Issacharoff,
Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 215 (2008) (pointing out that the “quasiclass occupies an interesting midpoint between public and private ordering, one that draws heavily
on the equitable powers of courts in an area bereft of formal rules of procedure”).
28 See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399, 400
(2014) (describing how transfer “is typically a one-way ticket”). In many MDL cases, the parties
agree to allow newly filed cases to bypass the transfer process altogether through a stipulation for
“direct filing” of cases into the MDL court. See Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing
and Choice of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 794 (2012) (describing
how the direct filing process lets plaintiffs “bypass the transfer process”).
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injury that are not well suited to class certification.29 Although MDL was
rarely used in products liability cases until the 1990s, those cases are now grist
for the MDL mill.30 Indeed, the ascendance of MDL is striking. While the
statistics tell only a partial story, the recent report that MDL cases comprise
more than a third of the federal civil docket is remarkable.31
There are numerous plausible explanations for why the class action has
taken a back seat to the MDL in mass tort cases. The simplest one is that
MDL just works better.32 That is, if the primary goal is to achieve mass
settlement of a nationwide controversy, the MDL device regularly
accomplishes that mission by gathering all of the involved parties in a single
proceeding before a judge who can flexibly guide the case to a resolution.33
By facilitating these resolutions, MDL serves the central players’ interests:
defendants prefer a unitary litigation that offers the possibility of peace
without the all-or-nothing risks of class certification, plaintiffs controlling the
litigation prefer organized and streamlined collective efforts, and the federal
courts prefer to avoid separate litigation of the thousands of cases that would
otherwise proliferate in a nationwide controversy.34 To say MDL “works” is
not to make a normative claim—it is simply to acknowledge that as a vehicle

29 See Thomas Metzloff, The MDL Vortex Revisited, 99 JUDICATURE 36, 40 (2015) (explaining
that MDL “is in fact dominated by mass-tort cases at a remarkable level”); Thomas E. Willging &
Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation
After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 793-94 (2010) (explaining the recent phenomenon of MDL
consolidation of products liability cases).
30 See Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26 REV.
LITIG. 883, 907 (2007) (noting that “the number of motions for multidistricting filed in product
liability cases increased dramatically in the 1990s”); see also Willging & Lee, supra note 29, at 798
(describing the “massive increase in MDL aggregate litigation”).
31 DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, MDL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES x-xi
(Sept. 2014), available at https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/MDL_
Standards_and_Best_Practices_2014-REVISED.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QVX-FAW5]; see also
Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 211, 222 (2015) (analyzing the composition of the JPML’s docket).
32 See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 270 (explaining how MDL “creates the perfect
conditions for an aggregate settlement”).
33 See Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical
Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883, 903 (2001) (finding that “[w]hen the JPML granted a
multi-districting motion, a case was much more likely to reach a collective resolution than when the
motion was denied”); Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of
Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 663 (2011) (“Similarly, federal
district courts may be able to superintend final resolutions by settlements in multidistrict cases when
those judges do not have the authority to preside at trials of the MDL aggregate.”).
34 See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 155 (“[T]he most successful step taken in the administration of
aggregate litigation in the United States was the creation of the JPML.”).
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for achieving resolution, it is remarkably effective and that it is an agreeable
process for the most prominent players.35
But the settlement class action also sought to serve these same interests—
why has MDL thrived while the class action has withered? One reason is
MDL’s different statutory structure: the surface-level modesty of limited
pretrial transfer better facilitates the tight packaging of cases within a single
unit without doctrinal hurdles. In earlier work, I have referred to MDL as
having a split personality: it is simultaneously a temporary coordination of
cases for limited proceedings and a close-knit consolidation under the plenary
control of a single judge. Each side of MDL’s split personality facilitates the
other.36 But that’s the engine of MDL: the patina of individual control
facilitates centralized judicial control. The secret of MDL’s success is that,
among a set of imperfect options, it better structurally achieves consolidation
without transgressing traditional norms of litigant autonomy and decentralized
trials.37 The doctrinal hurdles necessary to protect absentees in a class action
therefore appear unnecessary in an MDL. The result is, that unlike the class
action, to borrow a boxing metaphor, a doctrinal glove has never been laid on
the structure of the MDL.38 At the same time, however, because establishing
an MDL is so easy, the only threat to continued judicial control is the end of
the pretrial proceedings.39 In other words, it is relatively easy to establish an
MDL and bring cases in, but it is much harder for those cases to get out.40
This split-personality aspect of MDL has been there from the beginning
and continues to present challenging problems.41 In this Article, I do not
attempt to resolve these controversies, such as defining the appropriate role

35 Miller, supra note 2, at 310 (noting that MDL is “especially . . . useful when class certification
is unlikely because the litigants in the individual cases can be shepherded toward a global settlement
by the transferee judge”).
36 See Bradt, supra note 28, at 762. Professor Burch has similarly characterized MDL as a
“procedural no man’s land.” Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the Line
Between, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 889, 898 (2010); see also Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of
Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82
TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2265 (2008) (noting “an inherent tension in the split authority arrangement
Congress built into the statute”).
37 See Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1943,
1944 (2000) (noting that “[o]ur received traditions . . . are treasured, and properly so, but none of
them fares well when subjected to the test of mass tort litigation”).
38 See Redish & Karaba, supra note 24, at 115 (“[N]o court appears to have even considered,
much less ruled upon, a due process challenge to MDL.”).
39 See Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class Action is Not Possible,
82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2209 (2008) (describing MDL as “looser and more flexible” than class actions).
40 See In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 395, 405 n.16 (D. Mass. 2008)
(borrowing Issacharoff ’s comparison of MDLs to “roach motels” in which claims “check in—but
they don’t check out”).
41 Bradt, supra note 6, at 841.
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of the judge in an MDL settlement—I discuss this controversy elsewhere.42
But I do offer the following observation: One reason why the judicial role is
so controversial is that it lays bare the tenuousness of MDL’s split personality.
Once it becomes apparent that in practice MDL is more tight consolidation
than temporary coordination of individual cases, its lack of protections for
individual plaintiffs becomes difficult to ignore. And the split personality that
drives MDL becomes equally difficult to ignore. As we commemorate the
fiftieth anniversary of Rule 23, the fiftieth anniversary of MDL approaches.
As it does, continued close examination of whether it is in need of refinement
will be in order. For now, however, we rewind to the early 1960s.
II. THE PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT OF MDL AND NEW RULE 23
A. Two Committees on Two Tracks: Events
Leading up to November 1963
The amendments to Rule 23 and the new MDL statute were developed
simultaneously, but by two different committees with different agendas. The
Civil Rules Advisory Committee had been reconstituted in 1960 and had a
broad set of initiatives, only one of which was revising Rule 23.43 As David
Marcus has shown, any substantive aim of the drafters in amending Rule 23
was to facilitate civil rights actions seeking injunctive relief.44 But the
Reporters of the Committee also had a broader goal of updating the rule to
better fit current practice and respond to modern problems.45 They
understood that judges had started to use the class action device to handle the
problem of multiple cases litigating a single issue, so one reason to revisit the
problem of the “spurious” class action was to keep up with these innovations,
42 Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in
Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
43 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 356 (1967) (describing the “overhaul of the Rules
which has been in progress since the Committee was constituted”); Wright, supra note 1, at 417
(describing the “sheer bulk of the new material” circulated in 1964 for comment).
44 See Marcus, supra note 17, at 604-08 (noting that some members of the committee were
inspired by Rule 23’s “use as an aid to desegregation lawsuits” and that they “designed Rule 23(b)(2)
expressly for this cause”); David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications
for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657, 702-711 (2011) (explaining that [v]irtually every
effort to shape [Rule 23(b)(2)’s] terms” was made to facilitate desegregation litigation); see also John
P. Frank, Response to the 1996 Circulation of Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, in 2 WORKING PAPERS
OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23
262, 266 (1997) (noting the “single, undoubted goal” and “energizing force” of the committee to
“create a class action system which could deal with civil rights”).
45 Marcus, supra note 17, at 608 (describing the members’ desire for a “flexible rule” that would
be conducive to the kind of development in the case law that they “sensed” would occur as class
actions became more common).
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which sought to more efficiently resolve related controversies in a single case.
As the Reporters stated in a memo to their colleagues in March 1962:
We see the class action device as having a potentiality for healthy growth to
cope with an ever increasing volume of litigations involving large groups of
individuals. It must remain sufficiently flexible to meet new situations. We
suggest that the time may have arrived for a restatement of the Rule to
promote this flexibility.46

The memo proceeds to discuss the need to deploy the class action in tort
cases involving a large number of parties, noting both the benefits and the
central problem of litigation by a representative:
The class action is a device of convenience. It looks to disposition of
related or rather repetitive problems in one lawsuit. The device is in the
interest of members of the class, for it allows them to join together and
combine their resources; it is often in the interest of the adversary of the
class, for it saves him from the harassment of multiple litigation; and it is in
the interest of the public, for it reduces the units of litigation. These
considerations suggest a joinder of parties. The distinguishing problem in a
class action arises from the fact that there are a number of potential parties,
so large that it is impracticable to join them all. The solution is to permit
some persons to stand in judgment for all who are similarly situated.
But it is a drastic thing to cut off the rights of persons who are not
parties.47

Although the Reporters had “feeling[s] of solicitude about barring
individual claimants who have not deliberately joined” in cases involving mass
accidents,48 and recognized that “there may be occasions when special
considerations can properly move a court to deny full binding effect even
when the stated criteria for a model or standard class action otherwise exist,”49
they concluded that “that these are unusual situations. As a general rule,
where the criteria are satisfied, fundamental safeguards are respected, and
adequate representation is assured, the device of the class action should be
used to full effect. Full, ‘two-way’ binding effect should be the norm.”50
Ultimately, as of March 1962, the view of the Reporters was that:

46 Memorandum from the Reporters to the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. for the Mar. 28-30,
1962 Meeting at EE-2, in Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, microformed on CIS No. CI-630944 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
47 Id. at EE-20.
48 Id. at EE-29.
49 Id. at EE-63.
50 Id.
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The mere fact that the gravamen of the class action is the commission of a
tort, or that individuals are claiming recoveries in different amounts, or that
the rights asserted are somehow “several” (a point to which we return below),
should not itself exclude full binding effect. In particular, we think that the
class action with full binding effect has a part to play in solving the problems
created by multiple torts.51

An example of such innovation that the Reporters cite approvingly is the
Tenth Circuit’s decision in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, an
antitrust case brought by miners alleging a conspiracy by companies in the
vanadium-bearing ore industry.52 The district judge in the case allowed
plaintiffs to pursue a class action on behalf of all miners in the Colorado
Plateau.53 After a jury found that the inflation of the ore’s price was
attributable to the conspiracy, the trial judge allowed the miners who had not
yet appeared six months to file claims seeking damages.54 The defendants
objected on the ground that this allowed these claimants to “intervene after
determination of defendants’ liability, to share in the fruits of a judgment
obtained by their participating representatives.”55 But the Tenth Circuit
affirmed, explaining that any other result would be “grossly redundant.”56 It
added, “we envisage [Rule 23] as having a broader purpose—to allow a final
determination of common questions of law and fact. Otherwise [the rule] is
relegated to an out-of-context incongruity amongst the utilitarian procedural
modes which, when brought together, elucidate the modern-day concepts of
class actions.”57 In their 1962 memo to the Advisory Committee, the
Reporters considered going even further, suggesting “that if Rule 23
permitted, it might well have been desirable for the trial court—perhaps after
suitable notice—to treat the action as fully binding on the class to the extent
of the pervasive and dominating common questions.”58
The Tenth Circuit opinion in Nisley was written by Chief Judge Alfred
Murrah. That Murrah would have come to such a conclusion is unsurprising: he
was the Chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on Pretrial Procedure
and part of the committee created by Chief Justice Vinson in 1949 to study the

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id.
300 F.2d 561 (1962).
Id. at 567.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 589.
Id.
Memorandum from the Reporters to the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. for the Mar. 28-30,
1962 Meeting, supra note 46, at EE-63.
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growing problem of protracted litigation in “big cases.”59 These committees
urged “rigid control” of complex cases by judges, including increased use of
pretrial conferences to streamline litigation.60 Murrah traveled around the
country holding seminars for federal judges, at which he expounded on the
virtues of what we would now call managerial judging.61 Indeed, Chief Justice
Warren singled Murrah out for praise in a 1958 address to the A.B.A. in which
he decried the “interminable and unjustifiable delays in our courts.”62
When, in 1961, the biggest of big cases landed in the federal district courts,
Murrah was the judge Warren naturally turned to for help. In 1960, nearly
every American manufacturer of electrical equipment was indicted for
participating in a massive price-fixing conspiracy.63 The criminal cases were
resolved relatively quickly but by fall 1962, the conspiracy had spawned an
unprecedented number of civil antitrust cases brought throughout the federal
courts by purchasers of the equipment, including nearly every public utility
in the United States.64 Plaintiffs filed over 1800 cases in thirty-five federal
districts.65 To meet this torrent of cases, Warren created the “Coordinating
Committee on Multiple Litigation,” or CCML, to be chaired by Judge
Murrah.66 The CCML’s goal was to centralize the control of the litigation “in
the hands of as few judges as possible, who should carefully supervise and

59 See generally Breck P. McAllister, The Judicial Conference Report on the “Big Case”: Procedural
Problems of Protracted Litigation, 38 A.B.A. J. 289 (1952) (exploring the challenges that the “big case”
poses for the justice system).
60 See generally Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases—A Report Adopted by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, 13 F.R.D. 66 (1951). Murrah was considered the “master of the
theory and techniques of the pre-trial conference.” A. Sherman Christenson, When is a Pretrial
Conference a “Pretrial Conference”?, 23 F.R.D. 129, 131 (D. Utah 1959).
61 See, e.g., Alfred P. Murrah, Seminar on Procedures Prior to Trial, 20 F.R.D. 485, 491 (1957) (“A
judge must be willing to assume his role as the governor of a lawsuit. He can’t be just an umpire.”).
See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); Tobias Barrington
Wolff, Managerial Judging and Substantive Law, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1027 (2013).
62 See Earl Warren, The Problem of Delay: A Task for Bench and Bar Alike, 44 A.B.A. J. 1043,
1043, 1045 (1958) (“Judge Murrah has tried for ten years to demonstrate to our federal judges . . .
that, when placed in the hands of an able and sympathetic trial judge, pretrial procedure is an
important tool of judicial management.”). Murrah was indeed at the forefront of these activities.
See Terrence Kern, Judge Alfred P. Murrah—“A Vision of Things”, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 737, 775
(2004) (“Judge Murrah was at his strongest, and made his most lasting contribution, in the area of
procedural reform with a view toward increasing judicial efficiency.”).
63 See generally JOHN HERLING, THE GREAT PRICE CONSPIRACY: THE STORY OF THE
ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 92-93 (1962).
64 See generally CHARLES A. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES: THE
TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS (1973).
65 Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial
Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 622 (1964) (“The avalanche of over 1,800 complex, protracted cases
filed in thirty-five districts presented a serious challenge to the capacity of the federal courts.”).
66 Kern, supra note 62, at 782 (“Murrah’s chairmanship was an obvious outgrowth of the work
he had performed as chair of the judicial study group on protracted litigation”).
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regulate all discovery procedures.”67 The CCML established an office in
Chicago and named as its Executive Secretary Professor (and, as of 1963,
Dean) Phil Neal of the University of Chicago Law School.68
The CCML’s program to resolve the litigation expeditiously was
remarkably successful. The cornerstones of that effort were nationwide
depositions overseen by judges, national document depositories, and fasttracking cases involving the major players, like General Electric and
Westinghouse.69 The Committee itself had no power to enter orders
controlling dozens of federal judges hearing these cases, but the enormity of
the circumstances prompted cooperation by judges around the country.70 By
the middle of 1963, with discovery in full swing, the judges began to oversee
settlement talks between a “steering committee” of lawyers for the plaintiffs
and counsel for the largest defendants, General Electric and Westinghouse.71
The members of the CCML, in particular Judge Murrah, Judge Edwin
Robson of the Eastern District of Illinois, Judge William Becker of the
Western District of Missouri,72 and Dean Neal, had long believed that the
problem presented by the electrical equipment scandal would not be a oneoff, but was instead the tip of the iceberg.73 And it was not long after the
CCML was established that other district judges involved in similar cases
began asking it for help.74 Consequently, the Committee began in mid-1963
to develop ideas for “[a] new rule or new rules to permit unified judicially
controlled discovery in situations of multiple litigation” and which would
ensure “centralization of the power to make decisions.”75 The initial approach
67 Report of the Subcommittee on Pretrial Procedure for Considering Discovery Problems
Arising in Multiple Litigation with Common Witnesses and Exhibits to the Judicial Conference of
the United States 5 (March 2, 1962) (on file in Becker Papers, Box 6, Folder 15).
68 See Neal & Goldberg, supra note 65, at 624-25.
69 See BANE, supra note 64, at 215-250 (describing the cases’ settlement processes).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Like Murrah, Becker was an enthusiastic supporter of case management and took the lead
on developing the first version of what we now know as the Manual for Complex Litigation. See
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on
the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 294 n.26 (2013) (“The motor force behind
the drafting of the Manual was the leadership of William H. Becker . . . .”).
73 See Bradt, supra note 6, at 865 (describing their belief that many less widely publicized
groups of cases that involved common questions existed, and that a supervisory system should be
developed for identifying them).
74 See Phil C. Neal, Multi-District Coordination—The Antecedents of § 1407, 14 ANTITRUST
BULL. 99, 99 (1969) (noting that the CCML was created to alleviate the “sudden and extraordinary
burdens on the federal courts” brought about by a surge of big price-fixing cases). By this time, the
Committee had “taken under its wing” litigations involving the rock salt, concrete pipe, and
children’s schoolbook industries. Id. at 104.
75 See Discovering Instances of Multiple Litigation—A Clue to the Need for Manually
Operated Rules? 5-6 (June 7, 1963) (on file in Becker Papers, Box 17, Folder 39, Divider 1). Chief
Justice Warren supported the efforts from the outset. See Earl Warren, Address to the Annual Meeting
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was an amendment to the federal transfer statute allowing for wholesale
transfer of related cases to a single district, but the drafters quickly focused
instead on limited transfer for pretrial proceedings.76 Two concerns prompted
this shift to a more modest approach. First, the drafters worried that a “radical
forum non conveniens statute” transferring all related cases to a single district
would “present problems with due process overtones.”77 Second, as Becker
later put it, transfer for only pretrial proceedings “would allay massive
resistance” by plaintiffs’ lawyers concerned about losing their cases.78
So it came to be that in mid-1963 both the Advisory Committee and the
CCML were both developing provisions that sought (at least in part) to address
the problem of multiple litigation of common questions in the federal courts. But
the two committees were moving down separate tracks. Because the two
committees shared a member, Roszel Thomsen, Chief Judge of the District of
Maryland, they were aware of each other’s efforts, but they had not collaborated.79
B. The Civil Rules Advisory Committee Meets,
October 31–November 2, 1963
As noted above, as early as 1962, the Reporters had suggested that “the
class action with full binding effect has a part to play in the problems created
by multiple torts.”80 Indeed, in a footnote in the memo I describe in detail
above, the Reporters suggested that binding class actions “might prove helpful
in handling at least some of the aspects of the massive litigation rising from
antitrust claims against manufacturers of electrical equipment.”81 But the
possibility that Rule 23(b)(3) might be used in so-called “mass accident” cases
famously attracted the ire of Committee member John Frank, who proclaimed
himself “unpersuadably opposed to the use of the class action in the mass tort
of the American Law Institute, May 22, 1963 (“From the experience derived in processing this litigation
the subcommittee will endeavor to develop general principles applicable to the handling of discovery
problems in all multiple litigation.”).
76 Discovering Instances of Multiple Litigation, supra note 75, at 5-6.
77 Id. at 6. See also Notes on Meeting of November 14, 1964, Washington, DC (on file in Becker
Papers, Box 17, Folder 39) (referring to the original ideas as a “radical forum non conveniens statute”).
78 See Letter from Judge William H. Becker to Judge Albert Maris (June 15, 1964) (on file in
Becker Papers, Box 16, Folder 14).
79 At Thomsen’s suggestion, Sacks sent the Coordinating Committee the draft of proposed
amended Rule 23, but nothing else came of the communication at that point. See Letter from
Benjamin Kaplan to Dean Acheson (May 24, 1963) (on file in Becker Papers, Box 7, Folder 18);
Letter from Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the U.S., to Phil C. Neal, Dean, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. (May 28, 1963) (“Al Sacks
tells me that you expressed interest in our draft rule on class actions. I enclose a copy of the latest
version of text and note.”).
80 Memorandum from the Reporters to the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. for the Mar. 28-30,
1962 Meeting, supra note 46, at EE-53.
81 Id. at EE-63.
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situation,” because of the “loss of individual liberty” for claimants and his fears
that the class action would be a tool for defendants to engineer binding
judgments with the help of corrupt plaintiffs willing to take a dive.82
The Frank-Kaplan dispute came to a head at the now-well-known
Advisory Committee meeting held from October 31 to November 2, 1963, a
transcript of which can be found in the Records of the Judicial Conference.83
At the meeting, Frank again argued that section (b)(3) should be eliminated
altogether.84 Kaplan, in turn, made clear his view that, although in most cases
mass accidents would be inappropriate for class treatment, some provision
must be made for this “growing point of the law.”85 Amidst this impasse came
a suggestion from Judge Thomsen. Knowing that the CCML had begun to
turn toward the development of a proposed transfer statute, Thomsen
suggested that the two committees liaise to consider “an alternative to a class
suit to accomplish the greater part of the advantages of the class suit.”86 Frank
enthusiastically endorsed this suggestion, noting his admiration for the
CCML’s innovations in the electrical cases.87 In particular, he praised the
“judicial leadership to pull them together, but not in a fashion which can force
a person into in effect losing his chance for his rights.”88 He added:
The devices are working out so well in the electrical cases and showing that
we can keep the cases separate and in separate hands and that still by stern
leadership it can work out without overruling anybody’s rights and without
any risk of fraud at all. I am terribly pleased about it. We’re being controlled,
but we’re not being overridden, and it’s coming out quite sensibly I think.89

After further discussion and debate, two key developments emerged from
this meeting. First, it was agreed that the Reporters would attend the
82 Letter from John Frank to Benjamin Kaplan 2-3 (Jan. 21, 1963), in Records of the U.S.
Judicial Conference, microformed on CIS No. CI-6311 (Cong. Info. Serv.); see also Judith Resnik, From
“Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 10 (1991) (quoting the same letter from Frank
to Kaplan).
83 See Transcript of Meeting of the Federal Rules Advisory Comm. (Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 1963), in
Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference, microformed on CIS No. CI-7104 (Cong. Info. Serv.)
[Hereinafter, Fall 1963 Advisory Comm. Meeting].
84 Id. at 9 (citing the “interference with individual liberty and the possibility of fraud”).
85 Id. at 11.
86 Id. at 22.
87 Id. at 14.
88 Id; see also id. at 36 (Frank, suggesting that (b)(3) be “tabled pending counsel from Judge
Thomsen’s [committee] on the matters which he can so easily take up with the related Committee
in the future, because these are completely integrated problems”). Sacks was also in favor of
coordination with the CCML, noting that “if Judge Thomsen’s subcommittee comes up with an
available alternative that works very will [sic]. That alternative will lead judges to say no to the class
action just as this rule now permits.” Id. at 31.
89 Id. at 15. See also Frank, supra note 44, at 273 (recalling that “the committee thought MDL
preferable to class actions for mass accidents”).

2017]

MDL's Roots as a Class Action Alternative

1727

CCML’s upcoming meeting in New York two weeks later.90 Second, Frank’s
concerns about (b)(3) were alleviated, at least temporarily, by the adoption of
a proposal from Judge Charles Wyzanski to include in (b)(3) a provision
allowing class members to opt out.91 Support for Wyzanski’s proposal was
broad and immediate, and it assuaged Frank’s concerns.92 During the debate
however, Judge Thomsen interjected to clarify the difference between the
proposed class action opt-out right and what the CCML had in mind for its
proposed consolidation mechanism, warning that “Judge Murrah’s anxious to
nail him and not let him run his case.”93
C. The Reporters Meet With the CCML, November 17-18, 1963
As directed by the Committee, Kaplan and Sacks subsequently made
plans to attend the CCML’s upcoming meeting, to be held in New York on
November 17-18, 1963.94 By this time, discovery in the electrical-equipment
cases was moving full-steam ahead, and settlement talks between the
plaintiffs’ steering committee and General Electric had begun. Additionally,
a subgroup of the CCML, composed of Neal, Becker, and the Committee’s
law clerk, Perry Goldberg, had begun to turn its attention to developing the
statute providing for pretrial transfer. In a letter to Neal, Kaplan wrote:
With respect to the class suit problem it seems to me that our interests
intersect at perhaps two points. Recent experience may have indicated that
the class action device for handling ‘multiple litigation’ should be limited or
expanded in some particular way that is not already reflected in our proposed
Rule 23. Second, at a certain point in our draft we refer to the judge’s
considering what procedures are available as alternatives to a class action. The
point will be elaborated in the note to accompany the rule. We could draw on
your experience in describing the alternative procedures.95

Kaplan and Sacks then met with the small subgroup developing the
proposed statute (plus Judges Murrah and Thomsen) and, the following day,
90
91

See Fall 1963 Advisory Comm. Meeting, supra note 83 at 37.
Id. at 51 (proposing that “the class could never include anybody who specifically protests
within a given period”); see Burbank, supra note 13, at 1488 (stating that the opt-out provision was
“added very late in the drafting process”).
92 See Fall 1963 Advisory Comm. Meeting, supra note 83; see also Frank, supra note 44, at 269
(describing Wyzanski’s proposal as a “flash of genius”); Marcus, supra note 44, at 708 (describing
Frank’s reaction to Wyzanski’s proposal).
93 Fall 1963 Advisory Comm. Meeting, supra note 83 at 52.
94 Letter from Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Phil C. Neal, Dean, Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. (Nov. 6, 1963) (on
file in Papers of Phil C. Neal, Dean, University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, at the University
of Chicago Library, Special Collections Research Center).
95 Id.
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all of the judges handling the electrical-equipment cases. Several themes
emerge from the notes and memoranda memorializing these meetings
authored by Neal, Becker, and Kaplan and Sacks.
First, the group did not believe that the class action could or should be
the primary solution to the problem of multiple litigation. The MDL statute
was necessary to centralize multiple pending lawsuits in a single district over
the objection of recalcitrant parties and judges. As Becker put it, the proposed
Rule 23 was plainly insufficient because the “[b]ig probelm [sic]” was “one of
management” of multiple cases, and there needed to be a centralization of
power to identify them and “say where the cases should go.”96 Neal agreed in
a bulletin sent to all judges hearing the scattered electrical-equipment cases
summarizing the meeting, “The consensus was that the proposed rule change
would be most beneficial for resolving certain existing ambiguities of class
actions, but that a general solution of the problems posed by multiple
litigation will require more comprehensive treatment.”97
Second, the class action device should be available to supplement MDL
when needed to achieve efficiencies, including in some mass accident cases.
Because, as Kaplan and Sacks describe it, multiple litigation “will henceforth
be a staple item appearing with increasing frequency[,] . . . the problems will
have to be approached in a variety of ways,” and “a good deal of play in the
joints is imperatively required.”98 They concluded that “[t]he class-action
provided in Rule 23 is one of the devices needed to handle multiple litigation.
Present Rule 23 should be improved, and . . . the changes made should not be
such as to inhibit growth through case-by-case experimentation.”99 Indeed,
the CCML believed that the forthcoming “litigation explosion”100 would be
largely composed of so-called mass accident cases and a variety of approaches
would be necessary to resolve them efficiently.
Third, the CCML impressed upon Kaplan and Sacks its view that there
should not be an absolute right to opt out of either a class action or MDL

96 Minutes of Meeting of Co-Ordinating Comm. 2 (Nov. 17, 1963, 3:00 PM), Statement of
Judge Becker, Judge, W.D. Mo.) (on file in Becker Papers, Box 10, Folder 23) (emphasis omitted).
The notes also show that the Committee’s work went beyond antitrust to include “Disaster” and
“Products Liability” cases as well. Id. at 1.
97 Bulletin No. 20 from Co-Ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation to the Judges
Before Whom Electrical Equipment Anti-trust Cases Are Pending (Nov. 27, 1963) (on file in Becker
Papers, Box 8, Folder 19).
98 Memorandum to the Chairman and Members of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules 4
(Dec. 2, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI7104 (Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter Reporters’ December 2, 1963 Memo]. The Reporters added,
“In the present incubating stage of the development of methods to deal with multiple litigation, it
would be unwise to introduce stiff rules excluding judicial discretion.” Id.
99 Id.
100 Judicial Administration Hearings, supra note 7.
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consolidation. This view accords with the general position of the CCML,
whose judges believed that a mandatory MDL statute would be necessary
because the voluntary cooperation and good will of the parties that facilitated
the resolution of the electrical-equipment cases was not likely to recur.101 As
Kaplan and Sacks summarized: “The judges with whom we discussed opting
out were clear that it should not be allowed simply on the say-so of the
individual member of the class. The interest of the individual in litigating as
he pleased may be strong, but it should not be considered absolute.”102
Following the meeting with the CCML, in a December 2, 1963
memorandum to the Advisory Committee, Kaplan and Sacks proposed three
changes to Rule 23. The first was to add the well-known language to the
Advisory Committee note stating that a mass accident “is ordinarily not
appropriate for a class action.”103 The second was, in recognition of the CCML’s
nascent efforts to codify an MDL provision, to add to Rule 23(b)(3) language
requiring that a class action be “superior to other available methods for the fair
and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”104 And the third was to water
down the opt-out right inserted at the October meeting. Having “given this
proposal a second look,” the Reporters found the absolute right to opt out “to be
too rigid.”105 A member of a defendant class would opt out to “stave off an
adverse judgment,” while an absolute opt-out right for plaintiffs “could be
extremely burdensome not merely to the defendant opposing the class, but to
the judicial system itself, and yet the interest of the individual in maintaining a
separate action could in fact be trivial.”106 As a result, Kaplan and Sacks proposed
new limits. First, those who had already begun litigation could presumptively
opt out of a class unless the judge considered their inclusion “essential.”107
101 Co-Ordinating Comm. on Multiple Litig., Minutes of Meeting of Co-Ordinating
Committee Held on Monday, November 18, 1963, at 9:30 A.M. (Nov. 18, 1963) (on file in Becker
Papers, Box 17, Folder 39). Indeed, Coordinating Committee member Judge George Boldt, of the
Western District of Washington, contended that “[c]ooperation in [the] future cannot be expected”
and that coordination “[c]an’t be left to voluntary good will.”). Id.
102 Reporters’ December 2, 1963 Memo, supra note 98, at 6. As Kaplan and Sacks report, the
Coordinating Committee’s position on this was unconsidered. Id. at 4 (“The judges were quite aware
of the problem that has given us concern, namely, that of allowing the individual litigants a fair
amount of freedom while at the same time not undercutting the values (which in part accrue to the
individuals) of efficient unitary adjudication.”).
103 Id. at 5. Before this point, the note had read: “A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to
numerous persons is on its face not appealing for a class action . . . .” Id. The Reporters added, “[i]n
response to our question whether mass accident cases should be absolutely excluded, the judges of
the Coordinating Committee seemed clear that they should not be.” Id.
104 Id. Prior to this memo, (b)(3) required that the court be “satisfied that a class action will
facilitate the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Id.
105 Id. at 6. See also id. at 7 (“The proposed draft seems to us a reasonable and desirable
modification of the thought worked out at the Committee meeting.”).
106 Id. at 6.
107 Id.
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Second, those who had not begun litigation should have their “protest
considered by the court and decided without the aid of a presumption.”108
The specific change in language to the Advisory Committee note and the
addition of the superiority requirement were not controversial, but the
change to the opt-out requirement was.109 Frank renewed his objection to
(b)(3) in its entirety, on the ground that the compromise that he had
“cheerfully accepted . . . as a fairly satisfactory adjustment of differences” had
been altered “very substantially.”110 On the recommendation of Judge
Wyzanski, the Reporters’ proposal was changed to allow all class members a
presumptive, though not absolute, right to opt out. In Wyzanski’s view, “the
bar would be more easily persuaded” of this position.111
Frank was not so persuaded. He again sought the elimination of (b)(3).112
The Reporters struck back forcefully. Citing the addition of the superiority
requirement, they contended that “the stated criteria of subdivision (b)(3)
have now been so improved and tightened that only a very exceptional mass
accident case could qualify thereunder.”113 The Reporters also defended their
limitation of the opt-out right, citing input from the CCML as support for
their conclusion that an individual class member’s interest in exclusion may
be “overwhelmed by the practical desirability of resolving the whole
controversy in a single suit.”114 So emphatic was the Reporters’ view that they
108
109

Id.
Perhaps overshadowed by the Reporters’ proposed amendment to the opt-out provision,
the superiority requirement received no attention from the committee. In follow-up correspondence,
Acheson refers to the opt-out issue as the “only important point” raised by the Reporters’ December
memo. Letter from Dean Acheson, Chairman, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., to the Members of the
Civil Rules Advisory Comm. (Jan. 31, 1964), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
microformed on CIS No. CI-7003-05 (Cong. Info. Serv.); see also Memorandum by the Reporters of
the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 1 (Jan. 31, 1964), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7003-08 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (referring to the December
memo as raising “but one question of material consequence”).
110 Letter from John Frank, Member, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., to the Reporters to the
Civil Rules Advisory Comm. (Dec. 9, 1963) 1, in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
microformed on CIS No. CI-7003-15 (Cong. Info. Serv.).
111 Letter from Charles Wyzanski, Judge, D. Mass., to Benjamin Kaplan, Reporter, Comm. on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Dec. 4, 1963), in RECORDS
OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7003 (Cong. Info. Serv.). Judge
Thomsen concurred with Wyzanski’s proposal because he “recognize[d] the difficulty of selling this
to the Bar.” Memorandum by the Reporters of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 4 (Jan. 31, 1964), in
RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7003-08 (Cong. Info.
Serv.).
112 Letter from John Frank, Member, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., to Reporters of the Civil
Rules Advisory Comm. 3 (Jan. 16, 1964), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE,
microformed on CIS No. CI-7003-21 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (stating that it was “flat wrong to use class
actions ever in mass tort situations or in any typical trade regulation case”).
113 Memorandum by the Reporters of the Civil Rules Advisory Comm., supra note 111, at 3.
114 Id.

2017]

MDL's Roots as a Class Action Alternative

1731

proclaimed that an absolute right to opt out would “destroy the viability of
subdivision (b)(3),” which was “of great practical importance and has been
elaborately developed over the years.”115
The committee voted to circulate the rule for comment in 1964 without
only a presumptive right to opt out.116 Eventually, purportedly in light of
negative public criticism and pushback from several committee members, the
rule was changed at the 1965 Advisory Committee meeting to provide the
absolute right to opt out we are familiar with today.117 The give and take leading
to that ultimate change is a complicated story for another day. For our purposes,
it is enough to note that there was eventually enough resistance to the qualified
opt-out right that it had to be changed to achieve final Advisory Committee
sign-off on Rule 23(b)(3). No similar dissenting voices existed within the
CCML; that committee was fully committed to preventing defection from the
unitary, consolidated proceeding. The opposition was from without.
III. THE CCML’S REJECTION OF A PREDOMINANCE REQUIREMENT
After the November 1963 meeting with the Reporters, the CCML
pursued two parallel goals: the resolution of the electrical-equipment cases
and the development of an MDL statute. Both progressed rapidly. The
settlement discussions between the plaintiffs and General Electric that had
begun in 1963 bore fruit by the end of 1964, with GE eventually settling all
claims against it for approximately $300 million.118 Settlements in the rest of
the cases followed soon thereafter.119
Meanwhile, the drafting subcommittee consisting of Becker, Neal, and
Goldberg continued its work on an MDL statute. In June 1964, Becker
presented the outlines of a pretrial-transfer statute to his CCML colleagues.
In explaining why the subcommittee had opted against a complete-transfer
115 Id. at 4. The Reporters responded to Frank’s concern about “rigged lawsuits” to achieve
binding judgments against plaintiff classes, saying “[i]t is not possible to provide perfect assurance
that the proposed rule will prevent fraud in (b)(3) cases . . . but the safeguards that will appear in
the rule will be a great improvement over anything we have had before.” Id. at 7.
116 Letter from Dean Acheson, Chairman, Civil Rules Advisory Comm., to the Civil Rules Advisory
Comm. (Jan. 31, 1964), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI7003-22 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (reporting a 10-2 vote to publish the rule allowing opt-out “unless the court
finds that their inclusion is essential to the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy and states its
reasons for the finding”) (emphasis original; internal quotation marks omitted).
117 John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C.
L. REV. 323, 345 (2005).
118 BANE, supra note 64, at 250.
119 See Earl Warren, Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute (May 19, 1967)
quoted in MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION 6 (1969) (noting that, as of
May, 1967, “every single one of these cases has been terminated”); see also Resnik, supra note 82, at
32 (“Much legal commentary describes the work of the Committee as successful.”).
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provision, Becker noted that pretrial transfer was “the maximum practical
objective that is attainable.”120 Anything more aggressive would likely spark
“great opposition . . . from local lawyers fearful that all their business is about
to be seized by the city attorneys.”121 Although the transfer was limited,
Becker made clear that the proposal anticipated “plenary” control by the
transferee judge, including the power to grant dispositive motions and
summary judgment.122 The group unanimously supported the proposal, and
the subcommittee continued to refine the draft throughout 1964.
Although the Committee was receiving plaudits for its success, not everyone
was pleased with its efforts. More specifically, the defendants in the electricalequipment cases believed that the rapidity with which the consolidated litigation
was progressing was railroading them into settlement.123 Moreover, defense
counsel recognized that their biggest advantage in piecemeal, large-scale
litigation was their greater resources, and in consolidated litigation plaintiffs
could pool their resources and coordinate their activities to eliminate that
advantage.124 Defense counsel complained bitterly about the pace of the
electrical-equipment cases, and when the CCML announced that it would
pursue a permanent MDL statute, the defense bar fought it tooth and nail. In
their private correspondence, the judges of the CCML expressed their
frustration at what they perceived as obstructionism by the defendants, who
were “trying to do all they [could] to block [the] amendment.”125
Plaintiffs, for their part, enthusiastically supported the proposed statute.
Perhaps recognizing the benefits of potential consolidated large-scale litigation,
lawyers for the plaintiffs in the electrical-equipment cases were among the

120 Proposal for Legislation and Rules for Multiple Litigation (June 3, 1964) (on file in Becker
Papers, Box 1, Folder 1).
121 Notes of Co-Ordinating Committee Meeting 6, July 28, 1964 (July 28, 1964) (on file in
Becker Papers, Box 8, Folder 19).
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., William M. Sayre, Developments in Multiple Treble Damage Act Litigation, in 1966 CCH
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS’N ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 51-52 (“The defendants litigated, but
it was all uphill. The courts had little sympathy for their plight, and it must have been obvious to the
courts that their burden would be relieved if enough pressure were put upon the defendants to force
them to settle. And pressure there was.”); Miles G. Seeley, Procedures for Coordinated Multi-District
Litigation: A Nineteenth Century Mind Views with Alarm, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 91, 93 (1969) (describing
defense counsel’s views that they “feel that they and their clients were caught up in a torrent of judicial
efficiency over whose tumult they scarcely could make their voices heard”).
124 John Logan O’Donnell, Pretrial Discovery in Multiple Litigation from the Defendants’
Standpoint, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 133, 138-39 (1966) (describing how “[i]n multiple litigation, . . . the
differential is eliminated in large part” because “[p]laintiffs pool their resources and generally
designate their most experienced lawyers” to conduct discovery).
125 Letter from Edwin A. Robson, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill., to William
H. Becker, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo. (Oct. 21, 1964) (on file in Becker Papers,
Box 16, Folder 4).
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statute’s biggest boosters.126 Apparently satisfied with the statute’s limitedtransfer provision, the strongest objection this group raised was its concern that
the MDL not affect the choice of law in transferred diversity cases. The judges
assuaged that concern by asserting that transfer would not affect the governing
law under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Van Dusen v. Barrack.127
After developing the draft of the MDL statute to essentially what we
know well today, Judges Becker and Murrah took the lead on making the
proposal law. They eventually obtained the support of the Judicial Conference
and the Department of Justice and began a lobbying effort in the House and
Senate. There they would have to overcome the organized opposition of the
defense bar, which had generated a resolution against the bill by the American
Bar Association on the grounds that it was unnecessary and vague.128
By this time, two law firms had also emerged as additional major opponents
of the bill. Both firms represented defendants in the electrical-equipment cases:
Cravath, Swaine & Moore; which represented Westinghouse; and Dechert,
Price & Rhoades; which represented I-T-E Circuit Breaker. Both firms had
long expressed displeasure with the CCML’s efforts. For instance, Cravath
aired its discontent with the judges by going over their head to Warren Olney,
then the Director of the Administrative Office, complaining that the
“compression of defendants’ discovery and the resulting diminution of their
opportunity to prepare for trial has reached a point in our view where due
process is endangered and fair trials seem unlikely.”129
Dechert was also one of the loudest critics of coordinating the electrical
equipment litigation. The firm represented defendant I-T-E Circuit Breaker
Company, which was named in over 300 cases. The Committee had placed
the cases against I-T-E on the “back burner,” to be resolved after the
mountain of cases against General Electric and Westinghouse. Once those
cases settled in 1964, settlements of the cases against the smaller defendants
proceeded in droves. But I-T-E held out and refused to settle any of its cases.
The strategy for dealing with the remaining “back burner” cases was to
transfer all cases pending nationwide which dealt with a single product to a
single district judge for trial under the general transfer statute. For instance,
all cases involving hydroelectric generators would be sent to the Eastern
126
127
128
129

Bradt, supra note 6, at 892-93.
376 U.S. 612, 638 (1964); see also Bradt, supra note 6, at 878-79.
See Bradt, supra note 6, at 888-89.
Letter from Albert R. Connelly, Partner, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, to Warren Olney III,
Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Jan 22, 1964 (on file in Becker Papers, Box 7,
Folder 18) at 1 (“Since the Committee of Judges is dealing with these questions not as a court but
presumably as an instrumentality of the Judicial Conference of the United States, it has been
suggested that it would be appropriate to keep your office informed of defendants’ efforts to obtain
relief from the present schedules.”).
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District of Washington.130 By the end of 1965, I-T-E had the largest number
of still-pending cases of any defendant, some 365 in sixteen different
districts.131 At that point, the CCML decided that all cases involving circuit
breakers—including all those pending against I-T-E—should be transferred
to the Northern District of Illinois.132 I-T-E objected vociferously, but district
judges persisted in transferring all of the cases to Chicago.133
Among those judges was Judge Becker, who had initiated the transfer on
his own motion because “only by doing so is there a hope of processing this
unprecedented mass of litigation.”134 I-T-E unsuccessfully sought mandamus
in the Eighth Circuit, which lauded the CCML’s “progressive approach” to
resolving the litigation through encouraging transfers to a single court.135 The
Eighth Circuit also made clear its opinion of I-T-E’s resistance:
Petitioner admitted before the district court, as it had before the co-ordinating
committee, and as it does here, that it has not formulated any program, and
indeed that it is without even a suggestion of any plan, for effecting termination
of the litigation thus pending against it, either by way of desire to engage in
trials, of intention to attempt settlements, or of basis to seek dismissals. What
it seemingly wants done is simply to have all of the suits against it left alone
. . . . Needless to say, petitioner will be afforded the opportunity for a fair trial.
It cannot ask, however, to continue to have its cases stand still.136

Ultimately, all of the remaining cases against I-T-E were transferred to
Chicago; they all settled on the first day of the first trial in what was deemed
“a true courthouse steps settlement.”137 Indeed, by the end of 1965, the entire
electrical-equipment litigation was moving toward a conclusion.138
In the meantime, the MDL statute had stalled in the House, apparently
due to the ABA’s opposition.139 But there had been progress in the Senate, due
in large measure to the efforts of Sen. Joseph Tydings of Maryland, who, as
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Improvements in
130
131
132

See Atl. City Elec. Co. v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., 247 F. Supp. 950, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
Id. at 953.
Id. at 952 (discussing two motions, one seeking “an order to transfer cases in the circuit
breaker and power switchgear assembly product lines to the Northern District of Illinois”).
133 See, e.g., id. at 954 (finding the proposed transfers convenient for the parties and witnesses,
and “in the interest of justice”); I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Regan, 348 F.2d 403 (8th Cir. 1965)
(upholding the District Court’s transfer of cases to the Northern District of Illinois).
134 Kan. City Power & Light Co. v. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co., 240 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D.
Mo. 1965).
135 I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir. 1965) (per curiam).
136 Id. at 362-64.
137 BANE, supra note 64, at 378.
138 See BANE, supra note 64, at 339 (noting that by October 1965 “practically all claims of plaintiffs
against practically all defendants had been either tried or settled or were on their way to settlement”).
139 See Bradt, supra note 6, at 891.
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Judicial Machinery, was spearheading a series of administrative reforms, such
as the Federal Magistrates Act and the creation of the Federal Judicial Center.140
It also helped that Tydings’s mentor since his law school days was Judge Roszel
Thomsen—an important player from the prior chapter of this story.141
Tydings held two hearings on the bill. Phillip Price, of Dechert, was the
most visible and vociferous opponent of the MDL statute at the Senate
hearings.142 He railed against the statute, expressing his view that the judges
had shown a “complete lack of regard for the interests of the parties and of
the witnesses and counsel, and of the litigants.”143 Furthermore, Price viewed
the electrical-equipment judges as a cabal that would transfer cases on the
basis of “telephone conversations among other judges, conversations in
private in his own chambers with other counsel, conversations at a cocktail
party, or in the corridor.”144
At the hearing, after rebuking Price for obstructionism,145 Tydings
solicited constructive comments on the statute from the bar. The two that
apparently caught his attention were memoranda from Cravath and Dechert,
and Tydings sought Becker’s reactions to both. The two memoranda offer an
array of suggestions that limited the scope of the statute, but here I focus on
one they share: adding a predominance requirement to the statute. Although
Price sought a requirement that common questions of fact and law
predominate, while Cravath sought predominance only of questions of fact,
both had taken the position that the need for MDL treatment would be rare,
and they sought to ensure that rarity by making transfer more difficult.146
In a private memo to Tydings, Becker explained why he believed a
predominance requirement would be “undesirable and crippling.”147 With
fifty years’ worth of hindsight, Becker’s memo is striking. First, he disputed
the notion that MDL would be rare:

140 See, e.g., Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The Federal Magistrates Act: History and Development, 1974
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 565, 567 (1974) (noting Tydings’s interest in judicial administration).
141 Multidistrict Litigation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements of Judicial Mach. of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 3 (1966) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. Tydings refers to
Thomsen as his “former mentor . . . who taught me most of the law I know, not only when I was a
U.S. attorney but even earlier when I was in law school at the University of Maryland.” Id. at 3-4.
142 The other opponent was William Simon, of Howrey & Simon, who offered a somewhat
more tepid defense of the ABA’s resolution opposing the statute. See Bradt, supra note 6, at 895.
143 Id. at 112.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 115.
146 Id. at 134, 139.
147 Memorandum from William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of
Mo., to the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
Comments on Supplemental Statements of Mr. Phillip Price on Senate Bill 159 2 (March 18, 1967)
[hereinafter Price Response].
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All I can say on this is that prophesy is a risky business. I can imagine future
developments which will make the electrical equipment cases seem to be a
relatively simple mass of litigation. Suppose that soon a litigable question
arises concerning the injurious side effects of birth control pills on women
generally . . . . Suppose that liability for personal injury from air pollution
becomes the subject of multi-district litigation . . . . Suppose an automobile
manufacturer sells millions of a model of an automobile with an obviously
unsafe feature in violation of federal law, and massive litigation results.148

Becker’s prescience on the subject matter of future litigation is
remarkable, but so is his understanding of how a predominance requirement
might hinder effective aggregation. For one thing, Becker saw how a
predominance requirement for common questions of law could prevent
aggregation of claims based on state law, particularly in light of the
understanding that transfer into an MDL would not affect that law. To
Becker, “the words ‘of law’ should not be used at all because of obvious
reasons.”149 As he explained:
Suppose the United States Courts are flooded with hundreds of thousands of
diversity damage actions arising in 50 states as might result if a drug (such as
a birth control pill) was alleged to have side effects injurious to women
generally. The principal issue of fact would be the issue of alleged injurious
effects of the drug. Nevertheless the law applicable to the facts could be
different in some respect in each state. The suggested amendment would
exclude use of the efficient and economical procedures of the bill.150

Moreover, Becker understood how a predominance requirement for
common questions of fact could equally hamstring the consolidation. He
warned that such a requirement would make “unclear and unworkable a
simple, clear, workable bill. What does ‘predominate’ mean? Over what type
of question must the common questions of fact predominate? . . . These
irrelevant and vague conditions will multiply and complicate multiple
litigation rather than reduce and simplify it.”151
Becker also added his views about the authors of the proposed predominance
requirement. Of Price, he concluded, “[i]t is difficult for me to believe that the
author here has a genuine concern in view of past attitudes in the electrical
148 Memorandum from William H. Becker, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of
Mo., to the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach., Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate,
Comments on Memorandum for the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, by Cravath, Swaine and Moore, Dated
February 10, 1967, at 1 (Mar. 18, 1967) [hereinafter Cravath Response].
149 Price Response, supra note 147, at 3.
150 Id.
151 Cravath Response, supra note 148, at 6.
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equipment cases . . . . The proposed amendments . . . are calculated to cripple the
bill.”152 Becker was somewhat more diplomatic with respect to Cravath, noting:
I recognize the reputation and standing of the firm submitting the
memorandum. In no sense is the good faith of the firm questioned. Advocates
necessarily must in appraising a judicial reform take into account the interests
of their clients and of their own practice.
Judges necessarily must consider only the interests of the administration
of justice.153

Tydings apparently agreed and did not include a predominance requirement
among the small package of revisions the Judiciary Committee made to the
statute. And Becker was right not to compromise, for it was not long after that
the ABA had a curious change of heart and dropped its opposition to the statute,
a story I chronicle elsewhere.154 The MDL bill soon passed both in both houses
without a dissenting vote—or a predominance hurdle.
IV. OBSERVATIONS WITH THE BENEFIT OF
FIFTY YEARS’ HINDSIGHT
Several themes emerge from close attention to these two episodes in the
history of American aggregate litigation. One is further understanding of
something the rulemakers told us in 1966: Rule 23 was not intended to be the
primary aggregator of mass torts; MDL was. After collaborating with the
CCML, and understanding that a more comprehensive solution to multiple
litigation was in the offing, the Reporters to the Advisory Committee more
firmly established that hierarchy. Fifty years later, with some fits and starts
along the way, the relative positions of the two devices are essentially as the
drafters of both of them intended. Although the two provisions were never
meant to be an either/or proposition, the preeminence of MDL in mass tort
cases of nationwide import is now well established.155
Perhaps more interesting, however, is the contrast in the two provisions
arising from the different processes in which they were drafted. The restrictions
on the applicability of the 23(b)(3) class actions came out of a vigorous debate
within the Advisory Committee, in which concerns for the interests of absent
plaintiffs were front and center.156 It was those concerns that prompted the
152
153
154
155

Price Response, supra note 147, at 5.
Cravath Response, supra note 148, at 10.
Bradt, supra note 6, at 902-07.
COFFEE, supra note 2, at 116 (“[G]roup litigation that is the functional equivalent to the
class action has come to supplant the class action in the mass tort field.”).
156 Resnik, supra note 82, at 10 (“One of the factors clearly deserving consideration here is any
interest of the individual in pursuing his own litigation . . . .”) (quoting Memorandum from Ben
Kaplan to Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 1 (Jan. 17, 1963), available in National Records Center, 4205
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collaboration with the CCML, and it was those concerns that ultimately
ensured that the opt-out right in Rule 23(b)(3) was absolute. There was no such
dissent within the CCML, whose judges were single-minded in purpose and
philosophy. Those judges—who were creating their statute while
simultaneously steering the electrical-equipment cases to settlement—were
both focused on addressing a perceived “litigation explosion” and
philosophically committed to strong judicial control of cases.157
The opposition to the CCML came from without—from defendants that
the Committee considered obstructionist and self-interested. Unlike the Rule
23 amendments, defendants fought the MDL statute with vigor.158 The judges
supporting the MDL statute, led by Judge Becker, understood the
defendants’ strategy well and fought back, casting aspersions on both their
motives and their means.
Moreover, unlike Rule 23(b)(3), which started out broad and became more
restricted, the MDL statute was self-limited from the beginning due to the
drafters’ fears of resistance from plaintiffs’ lawyers. The resulting preemptive
political compromise was transfer for only pretrial proceedings with eventual
remand for trial. Plaintiffs—at least those who were consulted or commented—
were satisfied with the limited-transfer plan so long as their venue privilege for
trial, and its accompanying choice-of-law benefits, were not disturbed. The
electrical-equipment cases had demonstrated to them the benefits of aggregation
and motivated judicial control of the litigation, so they were happy to go along.
That said, it would be a mistake to think of the MDL statute as overly
solicitous of plaintiffs’ interests in controlling the litigation. The drafters of
the MDL statute surely did not want to trample plaintiffs’ rights, and to the
extent there was any substantive goal of the drafters it was to facilitate
effective private enforcement of the law through efficient litigation. But
setting aside the now unfortunately quaint notion that the proper response to
a “litigation explosion” is to facilitate such litigation more efficiently rather
than to invent ways to prevent it,159 it is clear that the drafters’ primary
Suitland Blvd, Maryland, Record Group No 116, Accession No 82-0028, Box 24, Folder labeled
“Kaplan memo 1/17/63 enclosing Topics EE and FF for February Meeting”); Marcus, supra note 17,
at 605 (discussing fear of “the loss of individual liberty”) (quoting Letter from John Frank to
Benjamin Kaplan 3 (Jan. 21, 1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed
on CIS No. CI-6312-20 (Cong. Info. Serv.)).
157 As we know from the research of Stephen B. Burbank and Sean Farhang, the Advisory
Comm.’s membership was not nearly as judge-dominated as it is today. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean
Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1511-12.
158 For an interesting theory about defendants’ relative indifference to the amendments to Rule
23, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Ironic History of Rule 23 (forthcoming) (on file with author) (arguing
that the business community perhaps believed that revised Rule 23(b)(3) would benefit them).
159 See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New
in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1890 (2008) (describing the “tort reform”
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purpose was not to protect litigant autonomy. Rather, the goal of MDL was
to protect the judiciary from crippling caseloads, and the solution was
centralized judicial management. The history demonstrates that a reason for
establishing MDL as part of the permanent federal procedural machinery was
the drafters’ belief that voluntary cooperation by the parties and federal
judges could not be depended upon in the future.160 Hence the need to place
the decisions of whether and where to transfer cases in the hands of the
JPML, and to place the unitary control of the litigation in the hands of the
MDL judge. The mainspring of that centralization in MDL is its founding
compromise: freely available limited transfer but complete control during the
period of transfer, which is usually, as the song goes, “all there is.”
What resulted from the two processes is a class action rule whose limitations
doomed its viability and an MDL statute that appears more modest, but which
is actually extremely powerful. Indeed, Judge Becker and his colleagues
understood that an absolute right to opt out and a predominance requirement
were effectively poison pills for the mass tort class action. That they do not
appear in the MDL statute is a testament to their understanding of how effective
aggregation could work, particularly in the era of the vanishing trial.
Today, with MDL ascendant, the prescience of MDL’s creators is
especially remarkable—see, for example, Judge Becker’s eerily accurate
premonition of major twenty-first century litigations—but much has changed
since the statute was passed, including the rise and fall of the mass tort class
action for trial or settlement. Now, the organized plaintiffs’ bar understands
that there are potential gains from global settlement.161 There is little doubt
that defendants recognize the benefits of MDL—it is logistically easier than
fighting cases out around the country, and the centralization of control in the
hands of one judge and a small group of lawyers facilitates eventual settlement.
Unlike the 1960s, a pre–class action era162 when defendants considered MDL
a threat to their inherent litigation advantages, defendants now see the

movement’s efforts “to blame most of America’s woes on a frightening, unjustified, and greedinspired ‘litigation explosion’” and to support “a broad range of legislative and judicial reform
measures designed to drive plaintiffs from the courts”).
160 Indeed, one argument Becker made defending the statute was that without it “litigants
would run cases.” Notes on Meeting of November 14, 1964, Washington, DC (on file in Becker
Papers, Box 8, Folder 19).
161 D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1192-98 (2013) (describing benefits to plaintiffs of non-class aggregation).
162 Indeed, the rapid ascendancy of the class action was apparently a surprise. See Arthur R.
Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92
HARV. L. REV. 664, 670 (1979) (“The class action onslaught caught everyone, including the
draftsmen, by surprise.”).
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benefits of an opportunity for global peace.163 And all sides recognize what the
small group of judges promoting MDL saw in the early 1960s: some sort of
aggregation mechanism is necessary to handle nationwide controversies.164 It
is natural, then, that for the most part judges have embraced MDL.
But with MDL’s ascendance has also come increased scrutiny, particularly
from academics. It oversimplifies matters to summarize all of this forceful
and trenchant scholarship, but a dominant theme is the concern that
individual plaintiffs’ interests are swallowed up in the aggregate. According
to the critique, the mass settlements brokered by repeat-player plaintiffs and
defendants, supervised by a judge whose primary motivation is in resolving
the controversy without remand, are a bad deal for individuals who have
functionally no control over their potentially high-stakes cases.165 This is
particularly problematic when one considers that the safeguards against these
problems in Rule 23 worked out by the Advisory Committee in 1966 do not
exist in non-class aggregations. Some judges have responded by supervising
MDL settlements under the aegis of a “quasi-class action.”166 While these
attempts to mitigate the problems of aggregate settlement have been
tentatively praised by some,167 they have also been criticized as lawless,168

163 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. L. REV. 399, 414
(2014) (“Centralization likewise advantages defendants by making meaningful closure possible
through a global settlement.”).
164 Miller, supra note 2, at 326 (“Not only is effective aggregate litigation a matter of common
sense, it is a matter of the rational utilization of litigant and judicial system resources; that is in
everyone’s interest. Global litigation peace is preferable to debilitating individualized litigation war.”).
165 See, e.g., Redish & Karaba, supra note 24, at 115 (“The sweeping deprivations of an
individual’s ability to protect his legal rights brought about by MDL cannot be justified by naked
concerns of pragmatism if the concept of due process is to mean anything.”); Silver & Miller, supra
note 27, at 124 (“Being stuck forever in a court that cannot preside over a trial and that wants a global
settlement at all costs, plaintiffs caught up in MDLs have little bargaining leverage.”)
166 COFFEE, supra note 2, at 116 (“The term quasi-class action has developed to describe this
new form of group litigation, and a few courts have sought to exercise close scrutiny over the
process.”); see also Wolff, supra note 61, at 1029.
167 See Miller, supra note 2, at 312 (describing quasi-class treatment as “pragmatic and creative
endeavors, but there are substantial questions about whether federal judges have authority to create
quasi-classes without meeting the requirements of Rule 23”).
168 See Howard M. Erichson, The Role of the Judge in Non-Class Settlements, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1015, 1025 (2013) (“Judges are well situated to adjudicate; they are not equally well suited to
decide for individuals whether those individuals should be willing to release their claims in exchange
for an offered compromise.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic
Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 552 (2013) (“[T]here is no constitutional, statutory,
doctrinal, or other basis for the quasi-class action.”); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The QuasiClass Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 391 (2011) (“MDL judges . . . by endorsing the concept of the
quasi-class action have greatly expanded the scope of their authority and have become complicit in
allowing private parties to accomplish the very backdoor settlements that the Supreme Court and
federal courts have disallowed for decades.”).
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unduly restrictive of litigants’ autonomy,169 or, worse, a cover for bad deals
achieved in the name of efficiency.170 Further, some accounts suggest that
pressures toward cooperation and cartelization among repeat-player lawyers
with (or aspiring to) leadership positions in other MDLs may limit the
effectiveness of competition among the mass of plaintiffs’ lawyers at keeping
the steering committee in check.171
An understanding of the underlying history of MDL will of course not
resolve debates about how the statute ought to be applied today, even if we
could accurately understand everything that was in the minds of the
drafters.172 This debate about whether MDL is the best of the available and
feasible alternatives will of course continue, aided by continuing experience
of judges and lawyers and developing empirical evidence. And a continuing
dialogue among interested players will yield more interesting policy
proposals seeking to maximize the good in MDL and minimize the bad. But
considering the parallel stories of Rule 23 and the MDL statute does shed
light on current debates about how MDL works in practice in several ways.
Mainly, the changes included in Rule 23 to cabin its use—and the way they
came to be interpreted—were intended to be checks on the district judge’s
discretion. They require the judge to surmount a series of obstacles before
certifying a class, and they allow class members to escape, as the CCML
might say, only on their “say-so.” MDL’s lodestar, by contrast, is firm judicial
control, accomplished by easy consolidation and lack of opt-out until the
conclusion of pretrial proceedings. Judge Thomsen’s apt summary of Judge
Murrah’s aim to “nail” a party “and not let him run his case” is indicative.173
The justification for this strong judicial control is the lack of a binding effect
on absentees in an MDL case. After all, the limited nature of the transfer

169 See Jeremy T. Grabill, Judicial Review of Private Mass Tort Settlements, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 123, 164 (2012) (“I continue to be troubled by the ongoing search for novel ways to bind
individual mass tort plaintiffs to outcomes by which they do not affirmatively agree to be bound . . .
or do not affirmatively support . . . .”).
170 See Miller & Silver, supra note 27, at 111 (arguing that “judges have compromised their
independence, created unnecessary conflicts of interest, intimidated attorneys, turned a blind eye to
ethically dubious behavior, and weakened plaintiffs’ lawyers’ incentives to serve clients well”).
171 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 71 (“External
competitive checks are likewise absent: the overwhelming message sent by transferee judges is that
leadership appointments—and the lucrative fees accompanying them—are conditioned upon cooperation
and team play. So, even though plaintiffs’ attorneys are assertive and ambitious, their calculated response
may be to silence their discord and achieve financial success by playing the long game.”).
172 See Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of
Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 292 (1990) (reviewing STEPHEN C. YEAZELL,
FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987)) (cautioning that
“inferences about Committee intent [are] somewhat hazardous and necessarily tentative”).
173 Fall 1963 Advisory Comm. Meeting, supra note 83, at 52.
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facilitates aggregation because control of the decision whether to go to trial
or not remains within the hands of the individual litigant.
The debate about MDL—and the use of the quasi-class action to mitigate
it—generally proceeds from the recognition that in practice the transfer is not
as limited as it would appear. Although the statute avoids the third rail of
binding absentees, it does in reality facilitate a significant loss of control for
individual plaintiffs, whose claims are often transferred far away and litigated
by lawyers they have not selected. And when the deals struck raise eyebrows,
the same concerns that led the Advisory Committee to restrict the availability
of Rule 23(b)(3) return to the fore. In this sense, then, the dominance of MDL,
a result in part meant to avoid fears about the mass tort class action, has
replicated them. And the carefully constructed split personality of MDL, which
more gently packages centralized judicial control, becomes more untenable.
CONCLUSION
Looking back at the simultaneous development of the 1966 amendments to
Rule 23 and the MDL statute reveals some interesting ironies. The opponents to
Rule 23’s use in mass tort cases demanded protections to ensure that individual
plaintiffs were not swept up in a potentially disadvantageous aggregation sought
in the name of efficiency. Those opponents apparently preferred MDL, which
offered the possibility of tight judicial control over pretrial proceedings, but
which did not produce a judgment that would bind absentees. The primary critics
of MDL worried that the statute would steamroll defendants who would be
overwhelmed and coerced into extortionate settlements.
Now, fifty years later, the sides have changed, with MDL emerging as the
dominant mechanism for aggregating mass tort cases—a result, incidentally,
that seems to have been intended by the drafters of both provisions. As MDL
continues to become dominant, the arguments that provoked the limitations
originally installed in Rule 23(b)(3) are now forcefully made against actual
practice in MDL. Those most concerned about the interests of individual
plaintiffs being swept aside see MDL as a steamroller, while defendants—
along with large plaintiff-side firms and judges—have begun to embrace
MDL as a means of achieving global resolution of large-scale litigation.
In a sense, then, we are back where we began: trying to optimize ease of
consolidation in a world of scarce litigation resources and the need to protect
individuals from being overwhelmed by an aggregation process that zealously
pursues resolution. Unlike Rule 23, MDL has gotten a bit of a free ride, thanks to
the structure created by its creators fifty years ago and the benefits of mass
resolution. The question going forward is whether that free ride should continue.

